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Abstract
This paper shows that in a multilateral bargaining setting where the sellers com-
pete a´ la Bertrand, a range of prices that includes the monopoly price and 0 are
compatible with equilibrium, even in the limit where the reputational concerns and
frictions vanish. In particular, the incentive of committing to a specific demand, the
opportunity of building reputation about inflexibility, and the anxiety of preserving
their reputation can tilt players’ bargaining power in such a way that being deemed
as a tough bargainer is bad for the competing players, and thus, price undercutting
is not optimal for the sellers.
Negotiators often use various bargaining tactics, manipulate the adversaries’ beliefs
and build false reputations to improve their bargaining positions and shares (Schelling
1960; Arrow et al. 1995). A growing literature on bargaining and reputation focuses
particularly on a specific tactic—standing firm and not backing down from the initial
offer—and analyzes its impacts on bilateral negotiations (Myerson 1991; Abreu and Gul
2000; Kambe 1999; Compte and Jehiel 2002; Atakan and Ekmekci 2010). This paper, on
∗This research was supported by the Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant (# 256486)
within the European Community Framework Programme. I would like to thank David Pearce, Wolfgang
Pesendorfer, Larry Samuelson, Mehmet Ekmekc¸i, Ennio Stacchetti, Kalyan Chatterjee, Vijay Krishna,
Ariel Rubinstein, Alessandro Lizzeri, Tomasz Sadzik, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments
and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants at Caltech, Penn State, Carnegie Mellon (Tepper
Business School), New York University, Maastricht, LUISS Guido Carli, Koc, Sabanci, Bogazici, Bilkent,
TOBB, METU, and Central European University. All the remaining errors are my own.
†Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey. (e-mail:
ozyurt@sabanciuniv.edu)
1
the other hand, highlights a new avenue through which reputations can tilt bargaining
power when bargaining takes place in a multilateral setting in which a buyer cannot
refrain from searching for a bargain.
I construct a simple market setup where the long side—the sellers—has virtually no
market power. There are three defining features of the model: First, a single buyer
negotiates with two sellers over the sale of one item. Second, the sellers make initial
posted-price offers in the Bertrand fashion. The buyer can accept one of these costlessly
or try to bargain for a lower price. Third, each player believes that its opponents might
have some kind of commitment forcing them to insist on their initial offers. That is,
the players can be obstinate with small probabilities, which affects the rational players’
negotiating tactics and provides incentives to build a reputation on their resoluteness.
Obstinate (or commitment) types take an extremely simple form. Parallel to Myerson
(1991) and Abreu and Gul (2000), a commitment player always demands a particular
share and accepts an offer if and only if it weakly exceeds that share. An obstinate seller,
for example, always offers his original posted price and never accepts an offer below that
price. Similarly, an obstinate buyer always offers a particular amount and will never agree
to pay more. Therefore, the reputation of a player is the posterior probability (attached
to this player) of being the obstinate type. For analytical clarity, I construct the model
with negligibly small frictions: the initial priors of each player being obstinate is small
but positive, and the search cost that the rational buyer incurs at each time he switches
his bargaining partner is very small but positive. Then I take the limit as these frictions
converge to 0.
The analysis of the model shows that even in the limit where the frictions vanish, a
range of prices including the monopoly price and 0 are compatible with equilibrium.1 This
conclusion is true because being deemed as a commitment type is bad for the competing
players. This finding contrasts the standard conclusions of the bargaining and reputation
literature, where the player who is believed to be a commitment type is immediately
conceded by his rational opponent.
Undercutting in this framework involves mimicking a less-greedy commitment type
than one’s opponent. The seller’s incentive to undercut his rival is eliminated not be-
cause undercutting reveals rationality or reduces the seller’s reputation. In fact, if a seller
undercuts, then the buyer fully believes that this seller is a commitment type. Undercut-
ting is unattractive precisely because the buyer believes that the undercutting seller is
obstinate and that a better deal is possible by bargaining with the undercutting seller’s
rival. In particular, the buyer bargains with the seller’s rival, uses the more advantageous
term offered by the undercutting seller as a threat point against the rival, and arrives
1This conclusion is true regardless of the players’ time preferences.
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at an agreement with a rational rival at the buyer’s most preferred terms. Thus, the
seller who undercuts does not steal the buyer from his rival and hence does not gain from
undercutting.
The formalization I propose in this article has three major benefits: First, the model
facilitates the investigation of the roles of strategic commitment and reputation that are
elements missing in existing formal models of search and multilateral bargaining. Second,
the model’s predictions and the equilibrium dynamics are robust in many aspects. Third,
given the sellers’ initial offers, the equilibrium strategies in the multilateral bargaining
game are essentially unique. This finding differs from the standard conclusion in nonco-
operative bargaining games that informational asymmetries give rise to multiplicities.2
This makes the model a fruitful ground to answer further questions regarding the impacts
of reputation on market outcomes and market microstructure.
Overview of the Results and of the Literature
Shelling (1960) points out the potential benefits of commitment in strategic and dy-
namic environments and asserts that one way to model the possibility of commitment is to
explicitly include it as an action players can take. Crawford (1982), Muthoo (1996), and
Ellingson and Miettinen (2008) follow this approach and show that commitment can be
rationalized in equilibrium if revoking it is costly. However, I adopt an approach follow-
ing Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), where commitments are
modeled as behavioral types that exist in the society, which rational players can mimic if
they prefer to do so. Abreu and Sethi (2003) support the existence of commitment types
from an evolutionary perspective and show that if players incur a cost of rationality,
even if it is very small, the absence of such behavioral types is not compatible with the
evolutionary stability in bargaining environments.
This paper is directly related to the reputation and bargaining literature initiated
by Myerson (1991). Myerson investigates the impacts of one-sided reputation building
on bilateral negotiations. Abreu and Gul (2000), Kambe (1999), and Compte and Jehiel
(2002) consider two-sided versions of it. Compte and Jehiel (2002) consider a discrete-time
bilateral bargaining problem in an Abreu-Gul setting and explore the role of exogenous
outside options. They show that if both agents’ outside options dominate yielding to
the commitment type, then there is no point in building a reputation for inflexibility,
and the unique equilibrium is again the Rubinstein (1982) outcome. The work of Atakan
and Ekmekci (2010) is the most closely related to this paper as they study a market
environment with multiple players. However, their main focus is substantially different.
2See, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
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They show—in a market with large numbers of buyers and sellers—that the existence
of commitment types and endogenous outside options provide enough incentive for the
rational players to create a false reputation on obstinacy. On the other hand, in this
paper, I aim to answer how reputational concerns affect the market participants’ pricing
and search decisions.
This paper is also related (though indirectly) to the literature initiated first by Shaked
and Sutton (1984) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and later followed by Gale
(1986a/b), Bester (1988, 1989), Binmore and Herrero (1988), Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1990), and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007). This paper adds to this literature by
showing that when players have reputational concerns, frictionless competitive markets
need not be Walrasian.
An important finding of bargaining models in search markets is that an outside option
plays a limited or no role when the continuation of negotiation is at least as valuable as
that of the outside option. The current model, however, makes this prediction invalid
by showing that the availability of an endogenous outside option substantially affects
the outcome in the bargaining between a buyer and a seller if reputational concerns are
present.
In the model, the rational buyer can costlessly learn and accept the sellers’ posted
prices. Therefore, price search is indeed costless. However, searching for a bargain price
is assumed to be costly, for analytical convenience, as the buyer suffers a very small but
positive switching cost each time he changes his bargaining partner. Regardless of his
initial reputation, the rational buyer believes that he can achieve a lower price by haggling
with the sellers, and the low cost of searching for a deal makes haggling more attractive
than accepting a seller’s posted price. In fact, the rational buyer strictly prefers to visit
sellers if his initial reputation is high (i.e., the buyer is strong) and is indifferent between
visiting stores and the immediate acceptance of the lowest price if the rational buyer is
weak (i.e., the buyer’s initial reputation is low enough).
Equilibrium analysis shows that sellers have no bargaining power when they fail to
coordinate on their initial offers or when the buyer’s initial reputation is sufficiently high
(i.e., the buyer is strong). When sellers post different prices, the rational buyer can
bargain with the seller whose posted price is higher (say seller 2) and uses the more
advantages terms offered by seller 1 as a threat point against seller 2 and arrives at an
agreement with the rational seller 2 at the buyer’s most preferred terms. On the other
hand, if the buyer’s initial reputation is sufficiently high so that his expected payoff of
visiting the other seller is no less than his continuation payoff with his current partner,
then the rational buyer can give a “take it or leave it” ultimatum to the first seller he
visits. In equilibrium, the rational sellers anticipate this, so they immediately accept the
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buyer’s most preferred terms whenever he visits their stores first.
As a result, when reputational concerns are present, if the buyer’s outside option
is high enough—which is the case when the sellers post different prices or when the
buyer’s initial reputation is sufficiently high—then the buyer’s bargaining power becomes
substantially strengthened, and the sellers accept any positive share the buyer offers. This
conclusion is in contrast with the standard bargaining models without obstinate types.
In those models, a seller can always offer the buyer’s continuation value and prevent the
buyer from leaving him empty-handed. However, this is never the case when commitment
types are present. When players have reputational concerns, offering something different
than his posted price would reveal a seller’s rationality, which yields surplus no more than
what the seller would achieve by accepting the buyer’s offer (see Myerson 1991; Compte
and Jehiel 2002).
However, when the buyer is weak, then the rational buyer’s desire to make a better
deal turns into a trap. This trap drags the rational buyer into a situation where he may
get much less than what he would achieve if he would have committed himself to accept
the lowest posted price. The problem is that the rational buyer cannot commit himself
to accept one of the posted prices immediately because searching for a bargain is equally
attractive to the buyer when he is weak. For this reason, the rational sellers do not have
to compete with each other over their posted prices, making positive prices consistent
with equilibrium.
In particular, when the buyer is weak, positive prices are consistent with equilibrium
because (1) reputation has a lock-in effect (analogous to Klemperer, 1987) for the buyer,
which provides leverage to the sellers, and (2) price undercutting is not optimal for the
sellers. When the buyer is weak and the sellers post the same price, conceding to the
first seller is at least as good for the rational buyer as visiting the second seller. The
rational buyer can credibly terminate the negotiation with the first seller and visit the
second seller only if the buyer maintains a sufficiently high posterior probability of him
being an obstinate type while negotiating with the first seller. However, this is possible
if the rational buyer plays a mixed strategy in which he accepts the seller’s price with a
positive probability before the buyer leaves the first seller. Because the rational buyer
plays a mixed strategy, the rational sellers receive ex-ante positive expected surplus in
equilibrium.
We reach the conclusion that price undercutting is not optimal for the sellers because
of two reasons: First, if a seller price undercuts, then the buyer fully believes that this
seller is a commitment type. Second, as I argued previously, posting different prices will
improve the rational buyer’s bargaining power remarkably. As a result, being perceived
as an obstinate seller reduces the chance that his offer will be accepted by the buyer
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because the rational buyer prefers to visit the undercutting seller’s rival—who is likely to
be rational—first, and this restrains a rational seller from underbidding his competitor.
This observation contrasts with the predictions of the bilateral bargaining models of
Kambe (1999), Abreu and Gul (2000), and Compte and Jehiel (2002). In their models,
being perceived as an obstinate type is immediately followed by a concession from the
rational opponent. High search cost clearly makes this trap go away as the rational buyer
knows that high cost decreases the attractiveness of searching for a deal.
The current model presumes that the buyer’s moves throughout the haggling process
are observable to the sellers. Therefore, the buyer can use his reputation that is built in
one store against the other seller. This might be a strong assumption for large markets,
where the buyers are usually anonymous. For this reason, in Section 3, I relax this
condition and suppose that the buyer’s arrival time to stores, initial offers, and the time
he spends in each store are not publicly observable. The simple extension of the model
shows that anonymity increases the sellers’ market power even further. Nevertheless,
to be deemed as a tough bargainer is still bad for the competing players, and so price
undercutting is not optimal.
Finally, the model’s predictions are robust in many aspects. For instance, in Section
2 (Theorem 3), I check if the impacts of reputation decrease in “larger” markets, where
the number of sellers is greater than two, and show that a range of prices, including the
monopoly price and 0 are still consistent with equilibrium. In addition, Section 3 shows
that the premises on the obstinate buyer’s store selection have no significant effect. That
is, even if the obstinate buyer is committed to immediately leave a seller’s store once
his offer is not accepted, then the lock-in effect of the reputation will still be in play,
making price undercutting suboptimal and positive prices consistent with equilibrium.
Finally, I show that reputational concerns of the players overwhelm their behaviors so
that equilibrium has a war of attrition structure. As a result, the equilibrium of the
haggling process is “independent” of the exogenously assumed bargaining protocols.3
3Likewise, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987); Samuelson (1992); Caruana, Eirav, and Quint (2007);
and Caruana and Einav (2008) show that credible commitment to certain promises, threats, or actions
would wash out technical specifications of the bargaining procedures.
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1 The Competitive-Bargaining Game in Continuous
Time
Here, I define the competitive-bargaining game in continuous time. Section 2 presents the
main results. Sections 3 offers some extensions of the model and provides some robustness
results.
The Players: There are two sellers having an indivisible homogeneous good and a
single buyer who wants to consume only one unit.4 The valuation of the good is one for
the buyer and 0 for the sellers. Both the buyer and the sellers have some small positive
probability of being a “commitment” type. An obstinate (or commitment) type of player
n ∈ {1, 2, b}, where b represents the buyer and 1 and 2 represent the sellers, is identified
by a number αn ∈ [0, 1]. A type αi of seller i ∈ {1, 2} always demands αi, accepts any
price offer greater or equal to αi, and rejects all smaller offers. On the other hand, a type
αb of the buyer always demands αb, accepts any price offer smaller or equal to αb, and
rejects all greater offers. I use the terms “rational” or “obstinate” with the identity of
a player (buyer or seller) whenever I want to differentiate the types of the player. Not
mentioning these terms with the identity of a player should be understood that I mean
both rational and obstinate types of that player.
I denote by C ⊂ [0, 1) with 0 ∈ C the finite set of obstinate types for all three players
and by pi(αn) the conditional probability that player n is obstinate of type αn given that
he is obstinate.5 Thus, pi is a probability distribution on C satisfying pi(α) > 0 for all
α ∈ C. For simplicity, I assume that pi is common for all three players. In case I need
to emphasize different obstinate types of player n, I use αn, α
′
n, and so on. The initial
probability that n is obstinate (i.e., player n’s initial reputation) is denoted by zn. I
restrict my attention to the case where the sellers’ initial reputations are the same (i.e.,
zi = zs for i = 1, 2) and that zb and zs take sufficiently small values. Finally, I denote by
rb and rs the rate of time preferences of the rational buyer and the sellers, respectively.
The Timing of the Game: The competitive-bargaining game between the sellers
and the buyer is a two-stage, infinite-horizon, continuous-time game. The sellers make
initial posted-price offers; the buyer can accept one of these costlessly (say over the phone)
or visit one of the stores and try to bargain for a lower price. The buyer can negotiate
4At the end of Section 2, I consider the case where the number of sellers is some N > 2. In Section
2, I show that positive prices can be supported in equilibrium even though the buyer has monopsony
power. In this respect, having more than one buyer can only strengthen the main findings of the paper.
5Having 1 /∈ C does not affect the analyses and the results of the paper but eliminates additional cases
that produce nothing new.
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only with the seller whom he is currently visiting. The buyer is free to walk out of one
store and try another, but at a cost (delay) of switching, which is assumed to be very
small. The reader may wish to picture this market as an environment where the sellers’
stores are located at opposite ends of a town, so changing the bargaining partner is costly
for the buyer because it takes time to move from one store to the other, and the buyer
discounts time.
More formally, the first stage starts and ends at time 0, and the timing within the
first stage is as follows: Initially, each seller simultaneously announces (posts) a demand
(price) from the finite set C, and it is observable to the buyer.6 After observing the sellers’
demands, the buyer has two options: He can accept one of the posted prices and finish
the game. Or he can make a counteroffer that is observable to the sellers and visit one
of the sellers to start the second stage (the bargaining phase).
Note that if seller i is rational and posts the price of αi ∈ C in stage 1, then this
is his strategic choice. If he is the obstinate type, then he merely declares the demand
corresponding to his type. Given the description of the obstinate players, if the buyer
accepts αi and finishes the game at time 0, then he is either rational and finishes the
game strategically or is obstinate of type αb such that αb ≥ αi. Likewise, if the buyer
makes a counteroffer αb ∈ C, which is incompatible with the sellers’ demands (i.e., αb <
min{α1, α2}), then this may be because the buyer is rational and strategically demands
this price or because the buyer is the obstinate type αb.
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Upon the beginning of the second stage (at time 0), the buyer and seller i, who
is visited by the buyer first, immediately begin to play the following concession game:
At any given time, a player either accepts his opponent’s initial demand or waits for a
concession. At the same time, the buyer decides whether to stay or leave store i. If
the buyer leaves store i and goes to store j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i, the buyer and seller
j start playing the concession game upon the buyer’s arrival at that store.8 Assuming
that the sellers are spatially separated, let δ denote the discount factor for the buyer
that occurs due to the time ∆ > 0 required to travel from one store to the other. That
is, δ = e−rb∆. Note that 1 − δ (the search friction) is the cost that the buyer incurs
each time he switches his bargaining partner.9 I assume that the search friction is very
6For analytical simplicity, I assume that the set of offers is common for all the players and is equal
to the set of obstinate types C. This restriction is dispensable and can be removed with no impact on
equilibrium outcomes.
7Therefore, if the buyer makes a counteroffer and demands αb that is greater than or equal to the
minimum of the posted prices, then the buyer is rational and strategically demanding this price.
8After leaving store i and traveling partway to store j, the buyer could, if he wished, turn back and
enter store i again. However, the buyer will never behave that way in equilibrium.
9One may assume a switching cost for the buyer that is independent of the “travel time” ∆, but this
change would not affect our results. However, incorporating the search friction in this manner simplifies
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small (i.e., 1 − δ is very close to 0) and thus, the finite set C is coarse relative to the
search friction.10 More specifically, I assume that for all α, α′ ∈ C with α > α′, we have
(1− α) < δ(1− α′). The idea behind this assumption is very simple: the friction should
not prevent the rational buyer to walk away from a store if he knows that the other seller
has posted a lower price.11 Concession of the buyer or seller i while the buyer is in store
i marks the completion of the game; if the agreement α ∈ {αb, αi} is reached at time
t, then the payoffs to seller i, the buyer, and seller j are αe−rst, (1 − α)e−rbt, and 0,
respectively. In case of simultaneous concessions, surplus is split equally.12
I denote the two-stage competitive-bargaining game in continuous time by G. The
second stage of the competitive-bargaining game is modeled as a modified war of attrition
game. Alternatively, for example, we could suppose that players can modify their offers
(in the second stage) at times {1, 2, ...} in alternating orders but can concede to an
outstanding demand at any t ∈ [0,∞). Given the behaviors of the obstinate types,
modifying his offer would reveal a player’s rationality, and in the unique equilibrium of
the continuation game, he should concede to the opponent’s demand immediately. Hence,
in equilibrium, rational players would never modify their demands. These arguments are
formally investigated in Appendix B for appropriately chosen parameter values.
The Information Structure: There is no informational asymmetry regarding the
players’ valuations and time preferences. However, players have private information about
their resoluteness. That is, each player knows its own type but does not know the
opponents’ true types.
In addition, I assume that all three players’ initial offers, the buyer’s timing, and
store selection are observable to the public. In Section 3, I consider a case where the
buyer’s arrival to the market and moves in negotiating with a seller are unobservable to
the public.
the notation substantially.
10In some markets, search friction may shape the market participants’ behavior significantly. However,
there are many examples where search cost is negligible (e.g., Alibaba.com, eBay, Amazon, and similar
e-commerce platforms).
11This inequality follows from the dynamics of the rational buyer’s haggling activities. Suppose that
the buyer is in store 1 and playing the concession game with seller 1 whose posted price is α. If the buyer
concedes to seller 1, the buyer’s instantaneous payoff will be 1−α. However, if the buyer (immediately)
leaves seller 1 and goes directly to the second seller to accept his posted price α′ (where α′ < α), his
discounted payoff will be δ(1 − α′). Hence, the inequality (1 − α) < δ(1 − α′) ensures that the rational
buyer will not hesitate to walk away from a store to accept the other seller’s lower price.
12This particular assumption is not crucial because simultaneous concession occurs with probability 0
in equilibrium.
9
More Details on Obstinate Types: The obstinate types are defined by the strate-
gies they pursue, and so they are strategy types. Details of their strategies are important
in determining the equilibrium behavior of the rational players. The critical assumption
for our results is that an obstinate player never backs down from his initial offer during
the concession games. The remaining details of the obstinate players’ strategies have mi-
nor impact on the main results in Section 2, and I prove this by analyzing some possible
alternatives in Section 3.
The remaining details of the strategies of the obstinate types are as follows: The
obstinate buyer of any type (or demand) αb ∈ C understands the equilibrium and leaves
his bargaining partner permanently when he is convinced that his partner will never
concede. If the sellers’ posted prices (α1 and α2) are the same or the obstinate buyer’s
type (αb) is incompatible with these prices, then the obstinate buyer visits each seller with
equal probabilities. Moreover, if a seller’s posted price is compatible with the obstinate
buyer’s type αb (i.e., min{α1, α2} ≤ αb), then he immediately accepts the lowest price
and finishes the game at time 0. Finally, the obstinate buyer with demand αb never visits
a seller who is known to be the commitment type with demand α > αb.
Strategies of the Rational Players: In the first stage of the competitive-bargaining
game G, a strategy for rational seller i, µi, is a distribution function over the set C. For
any αi ∈ C, µi(αi) is the probability that rational seller i announces the demand αi.
A first-stage strategy for the rational buyer consists of two parts: µb and σi. Although
the strategy µb is a function of the sellers’ announcements (α1 and α2) and σi is a func-
tion of all three players’ announcements, these connections are omitted for notational
simplicity. Given that each seller posts αi, µb(αb) is the probability that the rational
buyer announces the demand αb ∈ C with αb ≤ α, where α = min{α1, α2}. That is, µb
is a probability measure over Cα = {x ∈ C|x ≤ α}. I require that the game G ends in
the first stage, when the rational buyer announces α. That is, the immediate concession
of the buyer is represented by the buyer’s announcement of α. Moreover, σi denotes the
probability of the rational buyer visiting seller i first, and so σ1 + σ2 = 1.
If the competitive-bargaining game proceeds to the second stage and the first-stage
strategies of the players are µ1, µ2, σ1, and µb, then Bayes’ rule implies the followings:
The probability of seller i being obstinate conditional on posting price αi is
zspi(αi)
zspi(αi) + µi(αi)(1− zs) := zˆi(αi).
Furthermore, the probability that the buyer is the commitment type conditional on an-
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nouncing his demand as αb < α and visiting seller i first is
13
1
2
zbpi(αb)
1
2
zbpi(αb) + (1− zb)σiµb(αb)
[∑
x<α pi(x)
] .(1)
Second-stage strategies are relatively more complicated. A nonterminal history of
length t (i.e., ht) summarizes the initial demands chosen by the players in the first stage,
the sequence of stores the buyer visits, and the duration of each visit until time t (inclu-
sive). For each i = 1, 2, let Hˆit be the set of all nonterminal histories of length t such that
the buyer is in store i at time t. Also, let Hit denote the set of all nonterminal histories
of length t with which the buyer just enters store i at time t.14 Finally, set Hˆi = ⋃t≥0 Hˆit
and Hi = ⋃t≥0Hit.
The buyer’s strategy in the second stage has three parts: The first part determines
the buyer’s location at any given history. For the other two parts (i.e., F ib for each i),
let I be the set of all intervals of the form [T,∞] (≡ [T,∞) ∪ {∞}) for T ∈ R+ and
F be the set of all right-continuous distribution functions defined over an interval in I.
Therefore, F ib : Hi → F maps each history hT ∈ Hi to a right-continuous distribution
function F i,Tb : [T,∞]→ [0, 1] representing the probability of the buyer conceding to seller
i by time t (inclusive). Similarly, seller i’s strategy Fi : Hi → F maps each history
hT ∈ Hi to a right-continuous distribution function F Ti : [T,∞]→ [0, 1] representing the
probability of seller i conceding to the buyer by time t (inclusive).
Player n’s reputation zˆn is a function of histories and n’s strategies, representing the
probability that the other players attach to the event that n is obstinate. It is updated
according to Bayes’ rule. At the beginning of the game, we have zˆb(∅) = zb and zˆi(∅) = zs
for each seller i, where ∅ represents the null history. Given the rational buyer’s first-stage
strategies and a history h0, where the buyer announces αb and visits seller i first, the
buyer’s reputation at the time he enters store i (i.e., zˆb(h0)) is given by Equation (1).
Following the history h0, if the buyer plays the concession game with seller i until some
time t > 0 and the game has not ended yet (call this history ht), then the buyer’s
reputation at time t is zˆb(h0)
1−F i,0b (t)
, assuming that the buyer’s strategy in the concession
game is F i,0b .
Note that F i,0b (t) gives the probability that the buyer will accept αi prior to t. The
probability that the buyer will accept αi prior to t given that he is rational is higher, which
is equal to F i,0b (t)/(1 − zˆb(h0)). Therefore, the upper limit of the distribution function
13Given the sellers’ announcements α1 and α2, the obstinate buyer of type αb ≥ α = min{α1, α2}
accepts the seller’s price α and finalizes the game. Therefore, conditional on the buyer visiting seller
i first and demanding some αb < α, the probability that the buyer is obstinate of type αb should be
pi(αb)∑
x<α pi(x)
. Moreover, 12zb is the probability that the buyer is obstinate and he visits seller i first.
14That is, there exits  > 0 such that for all t′ ∈ [t− , t), ht′ /∈ Hˆit but ht ∈ Hˆit.
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F i,Tb is 1 − zˆb(hT ), where zˆb(hT ) is the buyer’s reputation at time T ≥ 0, the time that
the buyer (re)visits store i. That is, limt→∞ F
i,T
b (t) ≤ 1− zˆb(hT ). The same arguments
apply to the sellers’ strategies.
Since I will use zb, zs, and zˆs extensively in the paper, it is crucial to emphasize what
they refer to. I will denote the buyer’s and the sellers’ initial reputations by zb and zs,
respectively. The term zˆs represents a seller’s reputation at the beginning of the second
stage conditional on him posting price αs ∈ C. Although zˆs is a function of a rational
seller’s strategy and his posted price, I will omit this connection only for notational
simplicity.
Given F i,Tb , the rational seller i’s expected payoff of conceding to the buyer at time t
(conditional on not reaching a deal before time t where T ≤ t,) is
Ui(t, F
i,T
b ) := αi
∫ t−T
0
e−rsydF i,Tb (y) + αb[1− F i,Tb (t)]e−rs(t−T )(2)
+
1
2
(αi + αb)[F
i,T
b (t)− F i,Tb (t−)]e−rs(t−T )
with F i,Tb (t
−) = limy↑t F
i,T
b (y).
In a similar manner, given F Ti , the expected payoff of the rational buyer who concedes
to seller i at time t is
U ib(t, F
T
i ) := (1− αb)
∫ t−T
0
e−rbydF Ti (y) + (1− αi)[1− F Ti (t)]e−rb(t−T )(3)
+
1
2
(2− αi − αb)[F Ti (t)− F Ti (t−)]e−rb(t−T )
where F Ti (t
−) = limy↑t F Ti (y).
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2 Main Results
In this section, I present the main results of the paper. For this purpose, I fix the values
of δ, rb, and rs and the set of obstinate types C. Theorem 1 shows that all demands in the
set C can be supported in equilibrium for some values of zb, zs ∈ (0, 1). Then by Theorem
2, I prove that a range of prices that includes the monopoly price and 0 are compatible
in equilibrium even in the limit where the frictions vanish (i.e., zb and zs converge to 0).
Finally, Theorem 3 shows that Theorem 2 can be extended to the case where the number
of sellers is more than 2.
15Expected payoffs are evaluated at time T , and they are conditional on the event that the buyer visits
seller i at time T ≥ 0.
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Figure 1: The timeline of the buyer’s equilibrium strategy
For any zb, zs ∈ (0, 1), let G(zb, zs) denote the competitive-bargaining game G, where
the initial reputations of the sellers and the buyer are zb and zs, respectively.
Theorem 1 . For all αs ∈ C, there exists some small zb, zs ∈ (0, 1) and an equilibrium
strategy of the game G(zb, zs) in which both sellers post αs in the first stage.
I defer the proofs of all the results in this section to Appendix A. Note that for any
values of zb and zs, 0 is an equilibrium price. Theorem 1 shows that any positive demand
in C can be supported in equilibrium if we pick zs and zb as follows: For all αb ∈ C with
αb < αs, we have
zb ≤
(
zˆ2s
A
)λb
λs
(4)
where zˆs =
zspi(αs)
zspi(αs)+1−zs , A = 1− 1−δδ 1−αsαs−αb , λs =
(1−αs)rb
αs−αb and λb =
αbrs
αs−αb . The parameters
A, λb, and λs depend on the sellers’ and the buyer’s announced demands αs and αb, but
I omit this connection for notational simplicity.
A short descriptive summary of the equilibrium strategies are as follows: In the first
stage, both rational sellers post the demand αs, and the rational buyer visits each store
with equal probabilities and randomly declares a demand αb ∈ {α ∈ C|α < αs} with
probability µ(αb) =
pi(αb)∑
x<αs
pi(x)
. Therefore, if the game does not end in the first stage,
then Bayes’ rule implies that the posterior probability that seller i is obstinate is zˆs
(as defined above) if he posts αs and is 1 if he unilaterally deviates and posts a price
other than αs. Similarly, the posterior probability that the buyer is obstinate is zb if he
announces a price that is less than the sellers’ price αs and is 1 otherwise.
A short descriptive summary of the equilibrium strategies in the second stage is as
follows (see Figure 1 ): The buyer visits each store at most once. When the buyer enters
store 1 at time 0, the rational buyer plays the concession game with seller 1 until time
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T d1 = − log(zˆs)/λs > 0. If the game does not end prior to time T d1 , the buyer leaves store
1 at this time for sure and goes directly to store 2.
Note that building reputation on inflexibility by negotiating with the first seller is an
investment for the buyer, which increases his continuation payoff in the second store. In
equilibrium, the rational buyer leaves the first store when his discounted expected payoff
in the second store is at least as high as his continuation payoff in the first store. Since
zb is low relative to zˆs in equilibrium, the rational buyer needs to build up his reputation
before leaving the first store.
During the concession game, the rational buyer and seller 1 concede by choosing
the timing of acceptance randomly with constant hazard rates λb and λs respectively.
Conditional on the game lasting until time T d1 , seller 1’s reputation reaches 1, and the
buyer’s reputation reaches zb
1−F 1b (T d1 )
, where F 1b (T
d
1 ) is the probability that buyer 1 concedes
to seller 1 prior to time T d1 . The buyer’s posterior probability at time T
d
1 is strictly less
than 1 because it is the sufficient level of reputation that the rational buyer needs to walk
away from the first seller and to search a deal with the second one.
Once the buyer arrives at store 2, the buyer and seller 2 play the concession game
until time T e2 = −log(zˆs/A)/λs, the time that both players’ reputations simultaneously
reach 1. For notational simplicity, I manipulate the subsequent notation and reset the
clock once the buyer arrives in store 2. Thus, I define each player’s distribution function
as if the concession game in each store starts at time 0. In the second store, the rational
buyer and seller 2 also concede with constant hazard rates λb and λs, respectively. The
players’ concession game strategies are
F 1b (t) = 1− zb(A/zˆ2s)λb/λse−λbt F1(t) = 1− zˆseλs(T
d
1−t)
in store 1 and
F 2b (t) = 1− e−λbt F2(t) = 1− zˆseλs(T
e
2−t)
in store 2 (see Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.1 in Appendix A).16
In equilibrium, the rational buyer’s continuation payoff is no more than 1 − αs if he
reveals his rationality.17 Since the obstinate buyer leaves a seller when he is convinced
that his bargaining partner is also obstinate, leaving the first seller “earlier” (or “later”)
than this time (i.e., T d1 ) would reveal the buyer’s rationality. Moreover, since the cost
of switching the negotiating partners (i.e., the sellers) is positive, the rational buyer
never leaves a seller if there is a positive probability that this seller is rational, and he
16For notational simplicity, I skip the superscript T in players’ strategies.
17Arguments similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in the Online Appendix and the one-sided uncertainty
result of Myerson (1991, Theorem 8.4) imply this result.
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immediately leaves otherwise. Clearly, the buyer does not revisit a seller once he knows
that this seller is obstinate.
The rational players’ equilibrium payoffs in the concession games are calculated by
Equations (3) and (4). That is, for each seller i
vib = Fi(0)(1− αb) + [1− Fi(0)](1− αs), and(5)
vi = F
i
b (0)αs + [1− F ib (0)]αb.
However, the rational players’ equilibrium payoffs in the game G is different as they
should take into account the buyer’s outside option and store selection in the first stage.
In equilibrium, where the buyer first visits seller 1, the rational buyer leaves the first
seller when he is convinced that this seller is obstinate. At this moment, walking out of
store 1 is optimal for the rational buyer if his discounted continuation payoff in the second
store, δv2b , is no less than 1− αs, which is the payoff to the rational buyer if he concedes
to the obstinate seller 1. Let z∗b denote the level of reputation required to provide the
rational buyer enough incentive to leave the first store. Assuming that zb < z
∗
b (i.e., the
rational buyer needs to build up his reputation before walking out of store 1), the game
ends in store 2 at time T e2 = − log(z∗b )/λb. We find the value of T e2 by solving the equation
F 2b (T
e
2 ) = 1− z∗b , which is implied by the equilibrium: the buyer’s reputation reaches 1 at
time T e2 . Thus, given the value of F2(0) and the rational buyer’s discounted continuation
payoff in store 2, z∗b must solve
1− αs = δ[1− αb − zˆs(αs − αb)(z∗b )−λs/λb ],
implying that z∗b =
(
zˆs
A
)λb
λs , where A = 1 − 1−δ
δ
1−αs
αs−αb . Note that z
∗
b is well defined (i.e.,
z∗b ∈ (0, 1)) as A is positive. In fact, A is very close to 1 since the cost of traveling is
assumed to be very small.
I call the buyer strong if the first seller he visits makes an initial probabilistic con-
cession and weak otherwise.18 Similarly, seller i is called strong if the rational buyer
concedes to him with a positive probability at the time he visits store i first at time 0
and weak otherwise.
In equilibrium, the inequality given in Equation (4) (i.e., zb ≤ (zˆ2s/A)λb/λs) implies
that the rational buyer’s initial reputation is very low, and thus, he needs to spend some
time to build up his reputation before leaving the first seller. In this case, F1(0) = 0
(i.e., the buyer does not receive an initial probabilistic gift from seller 1), which implies
that the rational buyer is weak, and so the buyer’s expected payoff during the concession
game with seller 1 (i.e., v1b ) is 1− αs. Therefore, the rational buyer’s expected payoff in
18Note that the second seller (the one who is visited after the first seller) always makes an initial
probabilistic concession in equilibrium.
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the game is also 1− αs if he announces any demand in C that is less than αs. Thus, the
rational buyer has no incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategies.
In case one of the sellers—say, seller 2—undercuts his opponent and posts a price
α2 ∈ C such that α2 < αs, then there are two scenarios we need to consider: If α2 is
positive, then in the first stage, the rational buyer announces his demand as 0 and visits
seller 1 first (with probability 1) to make the “take it or leave it” offer; he leaves store
1 upon his arrival at that store. Conditional on not reaching a deal, the rational buyer
goes directly to seller 2 and accepts α2. On the other hand, rational seller 1 immediately
accepts the buyer’s demand. Therefore, in case the game does not end in store 1, the
buyer infers that seller 1 is the obstinate type with demand α1. However, if α2 = 0, then
the buyer immediately accepts the second seller’s posted demand and finishes the game
in the first stage (see Proposition 2.2 in Appendix A).
Therefore, if seller 2 deviates from his strategy and price undercuts his opponent,
then the buyer infers that seller 2 is obstinate with certainty (as sellers are playing pure
strategies in the first stage). Being perceived as an obstinate seller reduces the chance
that his offer is accepted by the buyer. This is true because the rational buyer prefers
to use the obstinate seller’s low price as an “outside option” to increase his bargaining
power against seller 1, whom he can negotiate and get a much better deal in expected
terms.
On the other hand, if seller 2 unilaterally deviates in the first stage and posts a price
α2 > αs, then the rational buyer visits seller 1 first and never goes to the second store,
and the concession game with seller 1 may continue until the time T e1 = − log zˆs/λs with
the following strategies: F1(t) = 1−e−λst and F 1b = 1−zb(1/zˆs)λb/λse−λbt (see Proposition
2.2 in the Appendix A).
Therefore, if rational seller i plays according to his prescribed strategies, his expected
payoff in the game is greater than u
2
[
1− zb
∑
αb≥αs pi(αb)
]
, where u =
∑
αb<αs
αbµ(αb)
(see the proof of Theorem 1). But a rational seller i’s expected payoff is much less than
zb+zs if he deviates from his equilibrium strategy (Lemma 2.2 in Appendix A). Hence, for
sufficiently small values of zb and zs, posting the nonzero price αs is an optimal strategy
for the sellers since the rational sellers’ equilibrium payoffs are strictly greater than what
they can achieve by price undercutting.
Note that Theorem 1 would still be true in case the buyer is known to be rational
but the sellers are not (i.e., zb = 0 and zs > 0). This is true because (1) the buyer would
be weak in equilibrium for any values of zs and αb and (2) the uncertainty regarding
the sellers’ actual types still gives rise to lock-in effect, and thus, price undercutting is
not optimal for the competing sellers.19 However, modelling the multilateral bargaining
19In fact, the lock-in effect in this case would be much stronger because (in any equilibrium) the buyer
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problem as a modified war of attrition game would be a very strong restriction because
Proposition B (in Appendix B) would not hold in this case.
The Limiting Case of Complete Rationality
I say the competitive-bargaining game G(zmb , z
m
s ) converges to G(K) when the se-
quences {zms } and {zmb } of initial priors satisfy
lim zms = 0, lim z
m
b = 0 as m→∞ and log zms /log zmb = K for all m ≥ 0(6)
Theorem 2 . If the game G(zmb , z
m
s ) converges to G(K), α
m
s is the equilibrium posted
price of the rational sellers in the game G(zmb , z
m
s ), and if αs ∈ C is a limit point of αms ,
then we have 2Kαrs ≤ (1− αs)rb holds for all α ∈ C with α < αs.
Theorem 2 indicates that a large set of prices can be supported in equilibrium even
when the uncertainties about the players’ rationality vanish. Theorem 1 proves that a
positive price αs ∈ C can be supported in equilibrium whenever the players’ initial priors
satisfy the inequality in Equation (4) for all α ∈ C with α < αs (i.e., the buyer is weak).
Therefore, for decreasingly small values of the initial priors, the limit of this inequality
yields the inequality that is given in the statement of Theorem 2.
Therefore, given the value of 0 < K, the set of equilibrium prices for the sellers
would converge to a subset of C—as zb, zs approach to 0—containing all αs ∈ C that
satisfy αs ≤ rbrb+2Krs . Thus, all prices in C can be supported in equilibrium with carefully
selected and vanishing initial priors. The monopoly price of 1, for example, can be
arbitrarily approached if the initial priors are selected so that K is sufficiently close to 0.
The final result of this section examines a straightforward extension of the model to
the case with N > 2 identical sellers. Let GN(zmb , z
m
s ) denote the competitive-bargaining
game where the number of sellers is N ; it is identical to G(zmb , z
m
s ) except for the number
of players. Let the convergence of GN(zmb , z
m
s ) to the game G
N(K) be identical to the
convergence of its two-seller counterpart. Therefore,
Theorem 3 . If the game GN(zmb , z
m
s ) converges to G
N(K) , αms is the equilibrium posted
price of the rational sellers in the game GN(zmb , z
m
s ), and if αs ∈ C is a limit point of αms ,
then we have NKαrs ≤ (1− αs)rb holds for all α ∈ C with α < αs.
Therefore, for any large but finite number of sellers N , we can find small enough zmb
relative to zms and K < 1/N such that prices arbitrarily close to 1 can be supported in
equilibrium with vanishing uncertainties.
should immediately accept a seller’s price αs and finish the game in stage 1.
17
3 Some Extensions
In this section, I will analyze various extensions of the model and show that the main
conclusions still hold. That is, to be deemed as a commitment type (even if it is a less-
greedy type) does not benefit the competing sellers, and so price undercutting is not
optimal. Thus, positive prices are consistent with equilibrium even when uncertainties
on players’ rationality are decreasingly small.
A. The Buyer’s Moves Are Unobservable to the Public
In this part, I investigate the case where the buyer’s moves and demand announce-
ments are not public. I will show that the sellers’ market power will increase further in
this case. That is, higher prices can be supported with equilibrium strategies that are
similar to those that we used to prove Theorem 1.
I make three modifications on the competitive bargaining game G. First, the rational
buyer announces his demand at the sellers’ stores and may offer different demands in each
store.20 Second, the buyer’s moves, including his arrival to the market, are unknown by
the public. That is, sellers can observe the buyer only when he visits their stores. Third,
related to the previous one, the buyer arrives at the market according to a Poisson arrival
process. Given that the rational buyer plays a strategy in which he visits both sellers
with positive probabilities upon his arrival at the market, the last assumption ensures
that sellers cannot learn the buyer’s actual type and whether they are the first or the
second store visited by the buyer.21
The next result shows that if zb is sufficiently small, then the following strategies
(which are similar to the ones that we defined in Section 2) support any αs ∈ C \ {0} in
equilibrium. Strategies are as follows: In the first stage, both sellers post αs. In the second
stage, upon his arrival at time T ≥ 0, the rational buyer (immediately) visits the sellers
with equal probabilities. Upon the buyer’s entry to store i (at time T ), the rational buyer
randomly declares his demand αb ∈ {α ∈ C|α < αs} according to µTαi(αb) = pi(αb)∑x<αs pi(x)
and starts the concession game with seller i. The players’ strategies in the concession
games are F Tb (t) = 1 − zˆ
T,i
b
zˆ
λb/λs
s
e−λbt and F Ti (t) = 1 − e−λst, where zˆT,ib is the probability
20Parallel to the assumptions made in Section 1, the obstinate buyer also announces his demand at
the sellers’ store if his demand is less than the posted prices. Otherwise, he immediately accepts the
lowest posted price and finalizes the game in the first stage.
21In the modified game, the rational players’ strategies, which may depend on time T indicating the
buyer’s arrival time, are equivalent to the strategies defined in Section 1 with one exception. Now,
µTα1 , µ
T
α2 are parts of the buyer’s second-stage strategies and functions of the sellers’ posted prices and
the arrival time T ≥ 0. Note that the first stage is time 0, where the sellers announce their demands
and the buyer observes these prices. The second stage starts at the time that the buyer arrives at the
market.
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that the buyer is the commitment type αb conditional on him visiting seller i at time
T and demanding αb < αi. The rational players’ hazard rates λb, λs are as given in
Section 2. The concession game with a seller may last until time − log(zˆs)/λs + T (i.e.,
the departure time from the first store) at which point both the buyer’s and the seller’s
reputations simultaneously reach 1.
Whenever a seller (say seller 2) deviates to a positive price that is lower than αs, the
rational buyer visits seller 1 first and demands 0. Rational seller 1 immediately accepts
the buyer’s demand. If he does not, the buyer leaves this seller, goes to store 2, and
accepts seller 2’s demand. However, if seller 2 deviates and posts 0, then the buyer
immediately accepts 0 and finishes the game in the first stage.
According to these strategies, the rational buyer will visit only one seller. Moreover,
due to the Poisson arrival process and Bayes’ rule, the sellers will be uncertain about
the buyer’s actual type whenever the buyer arrives at their stores for the first time. In
particular, zˆT,ib (i.e., the probability that the buyer is the commitment type αb conditional
on him visiting seller i at time T and demanding αb < αs) is independent of i, and it is
either equal to zb or to a number very close to zb.
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In particular, given that the buyer arrives at the market at time T and both the buyer
and the first seller are commitment types, the buyer (which is obstinate) leaves the first
seller at time − log(zˆs)/λs + T since he will be convinced at this time that his opponent
is also obstinate. However, in this case, the rational second seller will play the concession
game with the (obstinate) buyer, believing that the buyer is obstinate with probability
zb(1+zˆs)
1+zbzˆs
.
Proposition 3.1. For sufficiently small values of zb and zs, αs ∈ C\{0} can be supported
as equilibrium posted price of the rational sellers in the modified game G(zb, zs) whenever
zb ≤ zˆ
λb/λs
s
1+zˆs(1−zˆλb/λss )
holds for all α ∈ C with α < αs, where zˆs = zspi(αs)zspi(αs)+1−zs , λs =
(1−αs)rb
αs−α
and λb =
αrs
αs−α .
I defer all the proofs in this section to Appendix A. Proposition 3.1 is the counterpart
of Theorem 1 in the modified game. That is, it shows that any price in the set C can be
supported in equilibrium if the initial priors zb and zs are carefully selected. Note that
when zb satisfies the inequality given in Proposition 3.1, the buyer is weak in equilibrium
for any demand he announces in the sellers’ stores. Similar to Theorem 2, the following
result shows that a large set of prices can be supported in equilibrium even when the
uncertainties on players’ rationality vanish.
Proposition 3.2. If the modified game G(zmb , z
m
s ) converges to G(K), α
m
s is the equilib-
rium posted prices of the rational sellers in the modified game G(zmb , z
m
s ), and if αs ∈ C
22I calculate zˆT,ib formally in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
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is a limit point of αms , then we have Kαrs ≤ (1− αs)rb for all α ∈ C with α < αs.
Finally, since the buyer cannot carry his improved reputation when he leaves a seller,
the buyer is weak if and only if zb ≤ zˆ
λb/λs
s
1+zˆs(1−zˆλb/λss )
, and this is true regardless of the
number of sellers in the market. Therefore, the immediate counterpart of Theorem 3 will
be as follows:
Corollary 3.1 . If the modified game GN(zmb , z
m
s ) converges to G
N(K), αms is the equi-
librium posted price of the rational sellers in the modified game GN(zmb , z
m
s ), and if αs ∈ C
is a limit point of αms , then we have Kαrs ≤ (1− αs)rb for all α ∈ C with α < αs.
Note that a demand αs ∈ C satisfying the inequality provided in Theorem 2 (or
Theorem 3) also satisfies the inequality provided in Proposition 3.2 (or Corollary 3.1), but
the converse is not true. Thus, if the buyer’s moves are unobservable to the public, then
the sellers’ market powers may increase as higher prices can be supported in equilibrium
of the modified game.
B. The Case with a More Aggressive Obstinate Buyer
The assumption that the obstinate buyer visits each seller at time 0 with equal prob-
abilities is a simplification assumption. It can be generalized with no impact on the main
messages of our results. For example, one may assume that there are multiple types for
the obstinate buyer (regarding the initial store selection) such that some always choose
a fixed seller, and some visit the sellers according to their announcements, while the rest
are possibly a combination of these two.
The assumption on the obstinate buyer’s departure habit seems a strong one since it
eliminates the possibility that the rational buyer would increase his bargaining power by
committing to a particular pattern of store choice. In the next two parts, I show that the
main message of the paper will not change if the obstinate buyer is “more strategic” in
the sense that he commits to immediately switch or leave his bargaining partner in case
his demand is not accepted.
I first suppose that the obstinate buyer (of any demand) leaves the first store he visits
at time T = 0. The next result shows that any αs ∈ C is an equilibrium price for the sellers
if the buyer is weak in equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies are as follows: In the first
stage, rational sellers post the same demand 0 < αs, and the rational buyer visits each
seller with equal probabilities and randomly declares his demand αb ∈ {α ∈ C|α < αs}
according to µ∗b(αb) =
pi(αb)∑
x<αs
pi(x)
. At the beginning of the second stage, assuming that the
buyer visits seller 1 first, the rational buyer immediately accepts seller 1’s demand at time
0 with probability Pb =
(zˆs/A)λb/λs−zb
(1−zb)(zˆs/A)λb/λs and immediately leaves store 1 with probability
1 − Pb. Rational seller 1 never concedes to the buyer. The buyer and seller 2 play
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the concession game in the second store until time T e2 = − log(zˆs/A)λs with the following
strategies F 2b (t) = 1 − e−λbt and F2(t) = 1 − Ae−λst, where the terms zˆs = zspi(αs)zspi(αs)+1−zs ,
A = 1− 1−δ
δ
1−αs
αs−α , λs =
(1−αs)rb
αs−α and λb =
αrs
αs−α are equal to ones defined in Sections 1 and
2. Finally, in case one of the sellers deviate in the first stage, then the strategies of the
continuation game are given by Proposition 2.2 (in Appendix A).
Proposition 3.3. For sufficiently small values of zb and zs, αs ∈ C\{0} can be supported
as equilibrium posted prices of the rational sellers in the modified game G(zb, zs) (where the
obstinate buyer leaves the first store he visits immediately following his arrival) whenever
zb ≤ (zˆs/A)
λb/λs (αs−α)
αs+α
holds for all α ∈ C with α < αs.
Parallel to our results in Section 2, Proposition 3.3 shows that if zb and zs are selected
carefully, then all prices in the set C can still be supported in equilibrium.
C. The Case with the Most Aggressive Obstinate Buyer
Now suppose that the obstinate buyer (of any demand) leaves all stores immediately
following his arrival. The following strategies ensure that all demands in the set C can be
supported in equilibrium for small values of zb and zs. Rational sellers post the price of
0 < αs ∈ C, and the rational buyer visits each seller with equal probabilities and declares
his demand as αb < αs according to µ
∗
b that is given above. At the beginning of the
second stage, assuming that the buyer visits seller 1 first, the rational buyer immediately
accepts seller 1’s demand at time 0 with probability Pb =
αs(1−zb)−αb
(1−zb)(αs−αb) and immediately
leaves store 1 with probability 1 − Pb. Rational seller 1 never concedes to the buyer.
In store 2, rational seller 2 accepts the buyer’s demand upon his arrival with probability
Ps =
(1−αs)(1−δ)
δ(1−zˆs)(αs−αb) and never concedes to the buyer with probability 1−Ps.23 The rational
buyer does not leave store 2 immediately. Instead, he waits for the seller’s concession.
However, if the game does not end at time 0 by seller 2’s concession, the rational buyer
concedes to the buyer immediately. Finally, in case one of the sellers deviate in the
first stage, then the strategies of the continuation game are given in Proposition 2.2 (in
Appendix A).
Proposition 3.4. For sufficiently small values of zb and zs, αs ∈ C \ {0} can be sup-
ported as equilibrium posted prices of the rational sellers in the modified game G(zb, zs)
(where the obstinate buyer leaves both stores immediately following his arrival) whenever
zb ≤ (αs−α)2αs(αs+α) holds for all α ∈ C with α < αs.
23Note that Ps is in (0, 1) as zˆs <
(1−αs)(1−δ)
δ(αs−αb) < 1.
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D. Different Initial Reputations for the Sellers
Suppose for now that the probability distribution pii over C is different for each seller
i and the sellers’ initial reputations are not equal (i.e., z1 6= z2). These assumptions
would not change the essence of our results as long as z1 and z2 are small enough.
Similar to Theorem 1, in equilibrium, rational sellers post the same price αs whenever
the buyer is weak, which would mean zb ≤
(
zˆ1zˆ2
A
)λb/λs for all α ∈ C with α < αs, where
zˆi =
zipii(αs)
zipii(αs)+1−zi , A = 1 − 1−δδ 1−αsαs−αb , λs =
(1−αs)rb
αs−α and λb =
αrs
αs−α . As the rational buyer
is weak, his expected payoff is independent of the sellers’ initial reputations, and so these
particular sources of heterogeneity do not change the fundamentals of the competition
between the sellers.
E. Sequential Price Quoting
Suppose now that the price announcement in the game G is sequential. Seller 1
announces his demand first. Then the second seller posts his price after observing the
first seller’s announcement. Finally, the buyer declares his demand after observing the
sellers’ prices, and the rest of the game follows as before. Note that this change in the
first stage does not alter the equilibrium strategies of the players in the concession game.
Therefore, the continuation strategies provided in Section 2 still constitute an equilibrium
of the game G in the second stage.
Similar to the previous arguments, if the buyer is weak (i.e., zb ≤ (zˆs/A)λb/λs), then
the rational sellers’ expected payoff in the game increases with the price they post if zb
and zs are sufficiently small.
24 Hence, in equilibrium, both sellers will post the same price,
which will be the highest price available in the set C. As a result, given that the number
of sellers is N ≥ 2 and the buyer is weak, the unique equilibrium price will converge to
rb
rb+NKrs
(the upper bound we found in Theorem 3) when zb and zs vanish at the same
rate K.
24See the rational sellers’ expected payoff, for example, in the proof of Theorem 1.
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4 Conclusion
This paper investigated the impacts of reputation on competitive search markets where
the sellers announce their initial demands prior to the buyer’s visit and the buyer directs
his search for a better deal. Facing multiple sellers, the buyer can negotiate with only
one at a time and can switch his bargaining partner with some delay. A modified war of
attrition structure is derived in the equilibrium (see Appendix B).
In equilibrium, if the sellers’ posted prices are the same, then the buyer will never visit
one seller more than once. In Sections 2 and 3, I show that the range of prices including
the monopoly price and 0 are compatible in equilibrium even when frictions vanish. This
is mainly due to the fact that (1) reputational concerns of the buyer has a lock-in effect,
which forces the buyer to share a significant portion of the surplus with the sellers, and
that (2) being known to be a tough (obstinate) bargainer is not an advantage for the
competing sellers, and so price undercutting may not be advantageous. Further exten-
sions of the model show that the main message of the paper and the crucial dynamics of
the game are robust in many aspects.
Appendix A
Proposition 2.1. In any (sequential) equilibrium of the competitive-bargaining game G,
the rational buyer visits each store at most once. Moreover, the rational buyer leaves
the first store at some finite time for sure, given that the game does not end before, and
directly goes to the other store if and only if the first seller is obstinate. Finally, in an
equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability 1/2, leaves store
1 at time T d1 and finalizes the game in store 2 at time T
e
2 if the game has not yet ended
before, the players’ concession game strategies must be
F 1b (t) = 1− c1be−λbt F1(t) = 1− zˆseλs(T
d
1−t)
F 2b (t) = 1− e−λbt F2(t) = 1− zˆseλs(T
e
2−t)
satisfying
F 1b (0)F1(0) = 0 and F
2
b (T
e
2 ) = 1−
zb
1− F 1b (T d1 )
where λs =
(1−αs)rb
αs−αb and λb =
αbrs
αs−αb .
Proof of Proposition 2.1 . First, I will study the properties of equilibrium strategies
(distribution functions) in concession games. For this purpose, take any i ∈ {1, 2} and
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history hTi ∈ Hi, and consider a pair of equilibrium distribution functions (F i,Tib , F Tii ) de-
fined over the domain [Ti, T
′
i ] where T
′
i ≤ ∞ depends on the buyers’ equilibrium strategy.
Proofs of the following results directly follow from the arguments in Hendricks, Weiss
and Wilson (1988) and are analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 in Abreu and Gul (2000),
so I skip the details.
Lemma A.1 . If a player’s strategy is constant on some interval [t1, t2] ⊆ [Ti, T ′i ), then
his opponent’s strategy is constant over the interval [t1, t2 + η] for some η > 0.
Lemma A.2 . F i,Tib and F
Ti
i do not have a mass point over (Ti, T
′
i ].
Lemma A.3 . F Tii (Ti)F
i,Ti
b (Ti) = 0
Therefore, according to Lemma A.1 and A.2, both F Tii and F
i,Ti
b are strictly increasing
and continuous over [Ti, T
′
i ]. Recall that
Ui(t, F
i,Ti
b ) =
∫ t
Ti
αse
−rsydF i,Tib (y) + αbe
−rst(1− F i,Tib (t))
denote the expected payoff of rational seller i who concedes at time t ≥ Ti and
Ub(t, F
Ti
i ) =
∫ t
Ti
(1− αb)e−rbydF Tii (y) + (1− αs)e−rbt(1− F Tii (t))
denote the expected payoff of the rational buyer who concedes to seller i at time t ≥ Ti.
Therefore, the utility functions are also continuous on [Ti, T
′
i ].
Then, it follows that Di,Ti := {t|Ui(t, F i,Tib ) = maxs∈[Ti,T ′i ] Ui(s, F i,Tib )} is dense in
[Ti, T
′
i ]. Hence, Ui(t, F
i,Ti
b ) is constant for all t ∈ [Ti, T ′i ]. Consequently, Di,Ti = [Ti, T ′i ].
Therefore, Ui(t, F
i,Ti
b ) is differentiable as a function of t. The same arguments also hold for
F Tii . The differentiability of F
Ti
i and F
i,Ti
b follows from the differentiability of the utility
functions on [Ti, T
′
i ]. Differentiating the utility functions and applying the Leibnitz’s
rule, we get F Tii (t) = 1 − cie−λst and F i,Tib (t) = 1 − cibe−λbt where ci = 1 − F Tii (Ti) and
cib = 1− F i,Tib (Ti) such that λb = αbrsαs−αb and λs =
(1−αs)rb
αs−αb .
Therefore, the rational buyer’s expected payoff of playing the concession game with
seller i during [Ti, T
′
i ] is [F
Ti
i (Ti))(1− αb) + (1− F Tii (Ti))(1− αs)]. Moreover, by Lemma
A.3, we know that if the buyer is strong in a concession game with seller i (starting at
time Ti), then seller i is weak. Hence, there is no sequential equilibrium of the game G
such that the buyer visits a store multiple times. Suppose on the contrary that there is
a strategy in which, without loss of generality, the buyer visits store 1 twice. Then, the
buyer must be strong in his second visit to seller 1. Otherwise the buyer would prefer to
concede to seller 2 and finish the game before making the second visit to store 1 (because
δ < 1). Thus, since seller 1 is weak, his expected payoff is αb when the buyer visits his
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store for the second time. However, in equilibrium, this continuation payoff contradicts
the optimality of seller 1’s strategy because seller 1 would prefer to accept the buyer’s
offer (for sure) when the buyer first attempts to leave his store to eliminate a further
delay.
As a result, in equilibrium, rational sellers will not allow the buyer to leave their
stores. On the other hand, the rational buyer will eventually leave the first store he visits
if that seller is obstinate. The reason for this is clear. Since the players’ concession game
strategies are increasing and continuous, the seller’s reputation will eventually converge
to one at some finite time. The rational buyer has no incentive to continue the concession
game with an obstinate seller, and so he must either concede to the seller at that time
or leave the store. However, Lemma A.2 implies that concession game strategies must
be continuous in their domain, eliminating the possibility of mass acceptance at the time
that the seller’s reputation reaches one.
Next, for notational simplicity, I reset the clock each time the buyer arrives at a store,
and denote the buyer’s concession game strategy against seller i by F ib and i’s strategy
by Fi. Now, consider an equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with
probability σ1, leaves store 1 at time T
d
1 and finalizes the game in store 2 at time T
e
2 if
the game has not yet ended before. Then, rational buyer visits seller 2 only if F2(0) > 0
is true. Suppose F2(0) = 0. Then, the rational buyer’s discounted continuation payoff in
store 2, δ[F2(0)(1− αb) + (1− F2(0))(1− α)], will be δ(1− α). In this case, the rational
buyer prefers to concede to seller 1 instead of traveling store 2, yielding the required
contradiction. By lemma A.3., as F2(0) > 0, we must have F
2
b (0) = 0, implying that
c2b = 1. That is, F
2
b (t) = 1− e−λbt. Furthermore, assuming that the rational buyer leaves
store 1 at time T d1 and the concession game in store 2 ends at time T
e
2 , we must have
F1(T
d
1 ) = 1 − zs and F1(T e2 ) = 1 − zs. Thus we have c1 = zseλT d1 and c2 = zseλT e2 as
required.
Finally, Lemma A.3 implies that F 1b (0)F1(0) = 0. Since seller 2’s reputation reaches
1 at time T e2 , then the rational buyer will not continue the game G after this time. Thus,
his reputation must also reach 1 at that time, implying that F 2b (T
e
2 ) = 1 − z∗b where
z∗b =
zb
1−F 1b (T d1 )
is the buyer’s reputation at the time he arrives at store 2 and zb is the
buyer’s reputation at the time he arrives at store 1.
Lemma 2.1. In equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability
1/2 and zb ≤ z∗b (zˆs/A)λb/λs = (zˆ2s/A)λb/λs holds, the buyer leaves store 1 at time T d1 =
− log(zˆs)/λs for sure, if the game has not yet ended, and goes directly to store 2. The
concession game with seller 2 may continue until the time T e2 = −log(zˆs/A)/λs. The
players’ concession game strategies are F 1b (t) = 1−zb(A/zˆ2s)λb/λse−λbt and F1(t) = 1−e−λst
in store 1, and F 2b (t) = 1− e−λbt and F2(t) = 1− Ae−λst in store 2.
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Proof of Lemma 2.1 . Consider an equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller
1 first with probability 1/2 and zb ≤ (zˆ2s/A)λb/λs < z∗b . Then, the rational buyer prefers
to play the concession game with seller 1 over going to store 2 at time 0. Since the
buyer leaves store 1 if and only if seller 1 is obstinate, seller 1’s reputation reaches one
at time T d1 = τ1 = min{τ 1b , τ1} where τ 1b = inf{t ≥ 0| F 1b (t) = 1 − zb} = − log zbλb and
τ1 = inf{t ≥ 0| F1(t) = 1− zˆs} = − log zˆsλs denote the times that the buyer’s and seller 1’s
reputations reach 1, respectively.
However, leaving 1 is optimal for the rational buyer if and only if the buyer’s reputation
at time T d1 reaches z
∗
b , implying that
c1be
−λbT d1 =
zb
z∗b
(7)
Given the value of T d1 , solving the last equality yields the buyer’s equilibrium strategy in
store 1. Finally, the game ends in store 2 at time T e2 = τ
2
b = min{τ 2b , τ2} for sure where
τ 2b = − log z
∗
b
λb
and τ2 = − log zˆsλs , at which points both players’ reputation simultaneously
reach one. Given the value of T e2 , Proposition 2.1 implies the concession game strategies
in the second store.
Proposition 2.2. Consider a history at which sellers post the prices α1 and α2 with
α1 6= α2, seller 2 is known to be obstinate whereas the true types of seller 1 and the buyer
are unknown. Then following continuation strategies form a sequential equilibrium of the
continuation game followed by this history:
(i) If α1 > α2 > 0, then the rational buyer announces his demand as 0 and visits seller
1 first (with probability one) to make the take it or leave it offer; he leaves store
1 upon his arrival at that store. Conditional on not reaching a deal, the rational
buyer goes directly to seller 2 and accepts α2. On the other hand, rational seller 1
immediately accepts the buyer’s demand.
(ii) If α1 > α2 = 0, then the buyer immediately accepts the second seller’s posted demand
and finishes the game in the first stage.
(iii) If α2 > α1, then the buyer never visits store 2 and plays the concession game
with seller 1 until time − log zˆs
λs
with the following strategies: F1(t) = 1 − e−λst and
F 1b = 1− zb(1/zˆs)λb/λse−λbt.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 . First note that 1 − α1 < δ(1 − α2) because the search
friction is assumed to be sufficiently small. Therefore, it is optimal for the rational buyer
to go to store 2 and to accept α2 instead of accepting α1. Moreover, regardless of the
buyer’s announcement αb, postponing concession or not accepting αb is not optimal for
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rational seller 1 since the buyer will never accept α1 in equilibrium. Thus, it is a best
response for rational seller 1 to accept the buyer’s demand upon his arrival at store 1,
and so it is a best response for the rational buyer to choose αb = 0.
For the last part, if α2 > α1, then the buyer never visits seller 2. Therefore, in
any equilibrium, the continuation game is identical to the Abreu and Gul (2000) setup
and the equilibrium strategies are characterized by the following three conditions: (i)
F 1b (t) = 1 − c1be−λbt and F1(t) = 1 − c1e−λst for all t ≤ T e = min{− log zˆsλs ,
− log zb
λb
}, (ii)
(1 − c1b)(1 − c1) = 0, and (iii) F 1b (T e) = 1 − zb and F1(T e) = 1 − zˆs. Note that these
strategies form an equilibrium for small values of zs, in particular for the values of zs
such that zs < A. The rest of the strategies are optimal given the belief that seller 2 is
known to be obstinate.
Lemma 2.2. Consider the strategy profile σG described above where both sellers post price
αs > 0. Suppose that rational seller 2 deviates and posts α2 in the first stage. Then, his
continuation payoff in the game will be 0 if α2 > αs and α2
[
zb
∑
αb≥α2 pi(αb) + zˆs(1− zb)
]
,
which is strictly less than (zb + zs)α2, otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 . Recall that rational sellers’ price posting strategies are pure
in σG. Therefore, if rational seller 2 deviates to α2 at time 0, then other players will
conclude that seller 2 is obstinate of type α2. Given the assumptions on obstinate types,
the rational buyer’s expected payoff of posting α2 > αs is 0. Proposition 2.2 gives the
strategies of the continuation game following a history where seller 2 price undercuts his
opponent. Deviation to α2 = 0 clearly implies expected payoff of 0. However, if α2 > 0,
then the second seller’s expected payoff will be α2
[
zb
∑
αb≥α2 pi(αb) + zˆs(1− zb)
]
where
zb
∑
αb≥α2 pi(αb) is the probability that the buyer is an obstinate type with demand higher
than or equal to α2. Finally, note that zˆs =
zspi(αs)
zspi(αs)+1−zs < zs.
Proof of Theorem 1 . Note that 0 is equilibrium for any values of zb, zs ∈ (0, 1). Next,
I will prove that any αs ∈ C \ {0} can be supported in equilibrium whenever we have
zb ≤ (zˆ2s/A)λb/λs for all αb ∈ C with αb < αs. Therefore, fix the value of αs ∈ C and
suppose that zb ≤ (zˆ2s/A)λb/λs holds for all αb ≤ αs. Given that both sellers choose αs,
the equilibrium strategies of the rational buyer in the first stage, σ∗i and µ
∗
b , must satisfy
the followings.
1. σ∗i is the probability of visiting seller i first with σ
∗
1 +σ
∗
2 = 1 and µ
∗
b is a probability
distribution over the set D ⊂ Cαs = {αb ∈ C|αb ≤ αs} with
∑
x∈D µ
∗
b(x) = 1.
2. For all i ∈ {1, 2} and αb ∈ D we must have V ib (αb) = V . By Lemma 2.1 and by the
assumption that zb ≤ (zˆ2s/A)λb/λs , we have V ib (αb) = 1− αs.
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3. V ≥ 1−min{C \D}. That is, the rational buyer should have no incentive to deviate
and declare some other demand α′b which is not in the support of µ
∗
b .
Therefore, in equilibrium µ∗b and σ
∗
i are solutions of #D+ 1 (nonlinear) equations for
#D + 1 unknowns. For small values of zb (relative to zˆs), existence of these strategies is
easy to show. Consider the following strategy profile σG:
(a) In the first stage, rational sellers post the same demand αs (i.e., µ
∗
i (αs) = 1 and
µ∗i (α
′
s) = 0 for all α
′
s ∈ C \ {αs}), the rational buyer visits each seller with equal
probabilities (i.e., σ∗1 = 1/2) and declares a demand αb < αs according to µ
∗
b(αb) =
pi(αb)∑
x<αs
pi(x)
.
(b) (Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.1) In the second stage, following a history where
the buyer visits seller 1 first, the buyer leaves store 1 at time T d1 = − log(zˆs)/λs for
sure, if the game has not yet ended, and goes directly to store 2. The concession
game with seller 2 may continue until the time T e2 = −log(zˆs/A)/λs. The players’
concession game strategies are F 1b (t) = 1− zb(A/zˆ2s)λb/λse−λbt and F1(t) = 1− e−λst
in store 1, and F 2b (t) = 1 − e−λbt and F2(t) = 1 − Ae−λst in store 2. Symmetric
strategies would work following a history where the buyer visits seller 2 first.
(c) (Proposition 2.2) In case, one of the sellers, say, seller 2 undercuts his opponent
and posts a price α2 ∈ C such that α2 < αs, then there are two possible scenarios:
(i) If α2 > 0, then the rational buyer announces his demand as 0 and visits seller
1 first (with probability one) to make the take it or leave it offer; he leaves
store 1 upon his arrival at that store. Conditional on not reaching a deal, the
rational buyer goes directly to seller 2 and accepts α2. On the other hand,
rational seller 1 immediately accepts the buyer’s demand. Therefore, in case
the game does not end in store 1, the buyer infers that 1 is the obstinate type
with demand α1.
(ii) If α2 = 0, then the buyer immediately accepts the second seller’s posted de-
mand and finishes the game in the first stage.
(d) (Proposition 2.2) If seller 2 deviates and posts a price α2 > αs, then the buyer
visits seller 1 first and never goes to the second store, and the concession game
with seller 1 may continue until the time T e1 =
− log zˆs
λs
with the following strategies:
F1(t) = 1− e−λst and F 1b = 1− zb(1/zˆs)λb/λse−λbt.
Note that the strategies µ∗b and σ
∗
i satisfy the requirements 1-3. Moreover, by Lemma
2.1 and Proposition 2.2, the second stage strategies also form an equilibrium.
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Lastly, we need to show that the first stage strategies µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 are optimal. That is,
I will show that posting the demand αs at time 0 is an optimal strategy for a seller if the
other seller also posts αs. For this reason, I will first calculate each sellers expected payoff
under the strategy profile σG. Let Vi denote seller i’s expected payoff under the strategy
profile σG. Since a deviating seller’s equilibrium payoff is less than (zb + zs) (by Lemma
2.2), I will argue that price undercutting is not optimal if we choose zb and zs sufficiently
small. Moreover, following the assumptions on obstinate types, if a seller deviates and
posts a price above αs, then his expected payoff in the game will be simply 0.
Under the strategy σG, we have Vi = pαs+(
1
2
−p)(a+b) and we calculate it as follows:
Case 1. The buyer picks store i first and he is obstinate of type αb ≥ αs. Probability to
this event is 1
2
zb
∑
αb≥αs pi(αb) := p. Rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case
is αs.
Case 2. The buyer picks store i second and he is obstinate of type αb ≥ αs. Probability to
this event is p and rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case is 0.
Case 3. The buyer picks store i first and he is either rational or obstinate of type αb < αs.
Probability to this event is 1
2
− p, [1
2
(1 − zb) + zb 12 − p], and rational seller i’s
expected payoff in this case is
∑
αb<αs
[ pi(αb)∑
x<αs
pi(x)
][αb + F
i
b (0)(αs − αb)] := a where
F ib (0) = 1− zb(A/zˆ2s)
αbrs
(1−αs)rb .
Case 4. The buyer picks store i second and he is either rational or obstinate of type αb < αs.
Probability to this event is 1
2
− p and rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case
is e
−∆rs zˆs∑
x<αs
pi(x)
∑
αb<αs
zˆ
rs(αs−αb)
(1−αs)rb
s αbpi(αb) := b. Note that the buyer will visit the second
store only if the first seller is obstinate and the rational buyer announces αb < αs.
Therefore, seller i’s expected payoff in this case is discounted by the travel time
e−∆rs and zˆ
rs(αs−αb)
(1−αs)rb
s - the discount due to the delay in the first store j, i.e. T dj .
Note that Vi is strictly greater than (
1
2
−p)u where u is the convex combination of the
demands in Cαs \{αs}, i.e., u =
∑
αb<αs
αbµb(αb), and it is much higher than (zb+zs) if zb
and zs are sufficiently small. Hence, posting αs is optimal for each seller. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2 . Recall that Theorem 1 implies that for any given zmb and z
m
s
small enough the demand αms ∈ C can be supported as an equilibrium posted price of the
sellers in the game G(zmb , z
m
s ) whenever z
m
b ≤ [(zˆms )2/A]
αbrs
(1−αms )rb for all α ∈ C with α < αms
where zˆms =
zms pi(α
m
s )
zms pi(α
m
s )+1−zms . Taking the log of both sides we have
log zmb ≤
αrs
(1− αms )rb
(2 log zˆms − logA)
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dividing both sides by log zmb and taking the limit as m→∞ we get 2Kαrs ≤ (1−αs)rb
for all α ∈ C with α < αs, yielding the desired inequality.
Proof of Theorem 3 . Recall that the proof of Theorem 2 relies solely on the fact
that the buyer must be weak for each αb in the support of µ
∗
b . Same arguments in the
proof of Theorem 1 shows that if there are N identical sellers and the buyer is weak in
equilibrium, then we can support positive prices in equilibrium. Next, I will show that
being weak in equilibrium with N sellers means zb ≤
(
zˆNs /A
N−1)λb/λs .
For the ease of exposition, I will derive this condition for the 3-sellers case, which can
be extended to N -sellers case by iterating the same process. For this reason, suppose
now that there are three sellers all of which choose the same demand αs in the first stage
and the buyer declares his demand as αb < αs. Without loss of generality, I assume that
the buyer visits seller 1 first and seller 3 last (if no agreement have been reached with the
sellers 1 and 2). The following arguments are straightforward extensions of the approach
that I use in the proof of Proposition 2.1. Therefore, let T di denote the time that the
buyer leaves seller i ∈ {1, 2} and zˆb(T di ) denote the buyer’s reputation at the time he
leaves store i.
The rational buyer leaves seller 2 when his discounted continuation payoff in store 3,
i.e. δ[1 − αb − zˆs[zˆb(T d2 )]−λs/λb(αs − αb)], equals to 1 − αs. This equality implies that
zˆb(T
d
2 ) = (zˆs/A)
λb/λs . As a result, the buyer’s expected payoff in store 2 at the time he
enters this store is v2b = 1−αb− zˆs
[
(zˆs/A)λb/λs
zˆb(T
d
1 )
]λs/λb
(αs−αb). Similarly, the buyer leaves
seller 1 when his discounted continuation payoff in store 2, i.e. δv2b , equals to 1 − αs.
Then we have zˆb(T
d
1 ) = (zˆ
2
s/A
2)
λb/λs .
Also, note that we have zˆb(T
d
1 ) =
zˆ1b
1−F 1b (T d1 )
, F 1b (T
d
1 ) = 1− c1be−λbT d1 and c1b = 1 because
the buyer is weak. Thus, it must be true that T d1 = − log(zˆ
1
b/(zˆ
2
s/A
2)λb/λs )
λb
≥ − log zˆs
λs
again
because the buyer is weak. The last inequality implies zˆ1b ≤ (zˆ3s/A2)λb/λs . In equilibrium,
the last inequality must hold for all zˆib with i = 1, 2, 3, implying that it must hold for zb
as well. The rest directly follows from the parallel arguments of the proof of Theorem 2.
Iterating the above arguments suffice to prove the claim for any finite N .
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the Poisson arrival rate of the buyer is κ.
First, if the players play the strategies described in the main text, then the Bayes’ rule
implies that the probability of the buyer being the commitment type αb conditional on
him visiting seller i during the period of [T, T + dt] and demanding αb < αi is
zˆ
(T+dt),i
b =
1
2
zbpi(αb)κdt+
1
2
zbzˆspi(αb)κdt
1
2
zbpi(αb)κdt+
1
2
zbzˆspi(αb)κdt+ (1− zb)µTαi(αb)σi
(∑
x<αi
pi(x)
)
κdt
The first term in the numerator corresponds to the probability that the obstinate buyer
with demand αb is visiting seller i first and arriving at the market in a short period dt.
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Likewise, the second term denotes the probability that the obstinate buyer visits seller
i second, implying that the buyer should have arrived at the market − log(zˆs)/λs + ∆
units of time ago during the short period dt.25
Given the strategies of the players, if the buyer arrives at the market at the period 0+
dt, then the obstinate buyer’s arrival time at the second store is T¯ = −log(zˆs)/λs+∆+dt.
Therefore, the second term in the numerator does not exists if T < T¯ . Moreover, the
limiting case where dt approaches 0 implies that zˆT,ib equals to zb for all T < log(zˆs)/λs+∆
and to zb(1+zˆs)
1+zbzˆs
otherwise.
Second, for any 0 < αb < αs, we have zˆ
T,i
b < zˆ
λb/λs
s because zb <
zˆ
λb/λs
s
1+zˆs(1−zˆλb/λss )
.
Moreover, according to the strategies, the rational buyer never leaves the sellers’ stores.
This implies that the buyer and the seller will play the concession game according to
the strategies Fb and Fi’s until the time − log(zˆs)λs = min{−
log zˆs
λs
,− log zˆ
T,i
b
λb
} (this directly
follows from Abreu and Gul (2000), Proposition 1.) As a result, the buyer’s expected
payoff in each store is 1 − αs because independent of the buyer’s arrival time at either
store, the buyer will be weak in both. Hence, visiting each seller with equal probabilities
is an optimal strategy for the rational buyer. Furthermore, if the rational buyer leaves
his current bargaining partner at any point of time and goes to the other seller, then his
continuation payoff will be δ(1− αs). Hence, not leaving a seller’s store and playing the
concession game until the time − log(zˆs)/λs are also optimal strategies.
Third, independent of αb (≤ αs), the rational buyer’s expected payoff is 1 − αs in
each store. Thus, the mixed strategy µTαs(αb) =
pi(αb)∑
x<αs
pi(x)
is an optimal strategy for the
rational buyer.
Finally, I will show that posting the demand αs at time 0 is an optimal strategy for
a seller if the other seller also posts αs. For this person, I will first calculate each seller’s
expected payoff under the strategies given in the main text. Let Vi(T ) denote seller i’s
expected payoff in the game (evaluated in time T ) given that the buyer arrives at the
market at time T ≥ 0. Then, I calculate a deviating seller’s equilibrium payoff (again
evaluated in time T assuming that the buyer arrives at the market at T ) and argue
that it is smaller than Vi(T ) if we choose zb and zs sufficiently small. Thus, Vi(T ) =
[pαs + (
1
2
− p)(a+ b)] where
Case 1. The buyer picks store i first and he is the obstinate type with demand αb ≥ αs.
Probability to this event is 1
2
zb
∑
αb≥αs pi(αb) := p and seller i’s expected payoff is
αs.
Case 2. The buyer picks the other store j first and he is the obstinate type with demand
25Recall that −log(zˆs)/λs is the length of the concession game in the stores where λs = (1−αs)rbαs−αb , and
∆ is the time required to travel between the stores.
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αb ≥ αs. Probability to this event is p and i’s expected payoff is 0.
Case 3. The buyer picks store i first and he is either rational or the obstinate type with
demand αb < αs. Probability to this event is
1
2
− p, [1
2
(1 − zb) + zb 12 − p], and
seller i’s expected payoff is
∑
αb<αs
[ pi(αb)∑
x<αs
pi(x)
][αb + F
T
b (T )(αs − αb)] := a where
F Tb (T ) = 1− zˆT,ib zˆ
− αbrs
(1−αs)rb
s .
Case 4. The remaining case is that the buyer picks store j first and he is either rational or
the obstinate type with demand αb < αs. Probability to this event is
1
2
− p and
i’s expected payoff is e
−rs∆zbzˆs∑
x<αs
pi(x)
∑
αb<αs
αbzˆ
rs/λs
s pi(αb)
∫ − log(zˆs)
λs
0 e
−rst dFs(t)
1−zˆs := b where
Fs(t) = 1− e−λst.
On the other hand, if seller i price undercuts j and posts αi such that 0 < αi < αs, then
rational seller i’s expected payoff is
([
zb
∑
αb≥αi pi(αb)
]
+ zˆs
[
1− zb
∑
αb≥αi pi(αb)
])
αi, and
it is less than (zb+zs)αi (see Lemma 2.2). This is true because in any equilibrium following
the history where seller i price undercuts j, the rational buyer visits seller j first with
certainty, makes a “take it or leave it” offer 0, which will be accepted by the rational
seller j, and immediately leaves if seller j does not accept 0. Then, the rational buyer
immediately visits seller i to accept αi. It is clear that (zb + zs)αi < Vi(T ) for sufficiently
small values of zb and zs.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Recall that Proposition 3.1 implies that for any given zmb and
zms small enough the demand α
m
s is the equilibrium posted price of the sellers in the game
G(zmb , z
m
s ) whenever z
m
b ≤ (zˆ
m
s )
λb/λs
1+(zˆms )[1−(zˆms )λb/λs ]
for all α ∈ Cαms , where zˆms = z
m
s pi(α
m
s )
zms pi(α
m
s )+1−zms .
Taking the log of both sides we have
log zmb ≤
αrs
(1− αms )rb
(
log zˆms − log
[
1 + zˆms [1− (zˆms )λb/λs ]
])
dividing both sides by log zmb and taking the limit as m→∞ we get Kαrs ≤ (1− αs)rb
for all α ∈ Cαs .
Proof of Proposition 3.3. I will show that the strategies given in the main text con-
stitute and equilibrium. Suppose that the rational buyer announces αb < αs in the first
stage and consider the second stage. First, at time 0, the rational buyer and seller 1
has two options; accept and reject. Rejection for the buyer means leaving the store. I
assume that if the buyer chooses to leave but the seller accepts, then the game will end
with the seller’s acceptance. If the rational buyer does not leave the first store at time 0,
he reveals his rationality, in which case the buyer’s expected payoff will be no more than
1 − αs (since the buyer is discounting time). Hence, in equilibrium, the rational buyer
will either concede or leave the store at time 0.
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Second, if the rational buyer finishes the game in store 1 with probability Pb, then
the buyer’s reputation conditional on him arriving store 2 after visiting 1 is (zˆs/A)
λb/λs
as calculated by zb
zb+(1−zb)(1−Pb) . Therefore, the buyer and seller 2 will play the concession
game until time T e2 = min{− log(zˆs/A)λs ,−
logzˆs
λs
} which is equal to − log(zˆs/A)
λs
as A < 1. Thus,
the equilibrium concession game strategies in store 2 must be as given in the main text.
As a result, the rational buyer’s expected payoff in the second store is 1−αs
δ
.
Third, the rational buyer’s expected payoff of accepting αs in store 1 is
Vb(accept) = zˆs(1− αs) + (1− zˆs)
[
1
2
Ps(2− αs − αb) + (1− Ps)(1− αs)
]
whereas
Vb(reject) = zˆsδV + (1− zˆs)[Ps(1− αb) + (1− Ps)δV ]
where V = 1−αs
δ
is the buyer’s continuation payoff when he leaves the first seller at time
0. Note that if Ps = 0, then Vb(accept) = Vb(reject) = 1− αs, implying that the buyer’s
strategy Pb is a best response. Moreover, since the rational buyer’s expected payoff in
each store and in the game, regardless of his announcement αb < αs, is 1 − αs, visiting
each seller with probability 1/2 and announcing αb according to µ
∗
b are also best response
strategies.
Similarly, rational seller i’s expected payoff is
Vi(accept) = zbαb + (1− zb)
[
1
2
Pb(αs + αb) + (1− Pb)αb
]
whereas
Vi(reject) = zb0 + (1− zb) [Pbαs + (1− Pb)0]
Therefore, given the value of Pb and zb ≤ (zˆs/A)
λb/λs (αs−αb)
αs+αb
, we have Vi(accept) < Vi(reject).
Hence, Ps = 0 is a best response as well.
Finally, I will show that posting the demand αs at time 0 is an optimal strategy for
a seller if the other seller also posts αs. For this reason, I will first calculate each sellers
expected payoff in the game for the second stage strategies given in the main text. Let V i
denote seller i’s expected payoff in the game. Since a deviating seller’s equilibrium payoff
is less than (zb+zs) (by Lemma 2.2), I will argue that price undercutting is not optimal if
we choose zb and zs sufficiently small. We have V
i = αs
[
p+ (1−zˆs)
2
[Pb + e
−rs∆(1− Pb)]
]
and calculate it as follows:
Case 1. The buyer picks store i first and he is obstinate of type αb ≥ αs. Probability to
this event is 1
2
zb
∑
αb≥αs pi(αb) := p. Rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case
is αs.
Case 2. The buyer picks store i second and he is obstinate of type αb ≥ αs. Probability to
this event is p and rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case is 0.
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Case 3. The buyer is obstinate of type αb < αs. Probability to this event is zb − 2p and
rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case is 0.
Case 4. The buyer picks store i first and he is rational. Probability to this event is (1− zˆs)12
and rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case is Pbαs.
Case 5. The buyer picks store i second and he is rational. Probability to this event is
(1− zˆs)12 and rational seller i’s expected payoff in this case is (1− Pb)e−rs∆αs.
Note that for small values of zb and zs, the value of V
i is greater than (zb + zs) which
concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Similar arguments in the proof of Proposition 3.3 will prove
our claim. Note that given the value of Pb, as in the main text, the buyer’s reputation
conditional on him announcing αb and arriving store 2 after visiting store 1 is z
∗
b = 1− αbαs .
The value of z∗b makes rational seller 2 indifferent between immediate concession, with
payoff of αb, and rejection with payoff of (1− z∗b )αs. Since rational seller 2 is indifferent,
immediate concession with probability Ps (as given in the main text) is optimal. More-
over, Ps ensures the expected payoff of
(1−αs)
δ
to the rational buyer, and it makes the buyer
indifferent between conceding to seller 1 and leaving for seller 2. Finally, with the value of
Pb and zb ≤ (αs−αb)2αs(αs+αb) , rational seller 1’s expected payoff of rejecting the buyer’s demand
is higher than conceding to him as V1(accept) = zbαb + (1− zb)[12Pb(αs +αb)− (1−Pbαb)]
and V1(reject) = (1− zb)Pbαs.
Appendix B
The Discrete-Time Model and Convergence
Here, I consider the competitive-bargaining game in discrete time and investigate the
structure of its equilibria as players can make their offers increasingly frequent. I show
that given the symmetric obstinate types, the second stage equilibrium outcomes of the
competitive-bargaining game in discrete-time converge to a unique limit, independent
of the exogenously given bargaining protocols, as time between offers approach to 0,
and this limit is equivalent to the unique outcome of the continuous-time game partially
investigated in Section 2. I characterize the second stage equilibrium strategies of the
game G (given that both sellers post the same demand 0 < αs ∈ C) in Online Appendix.
To be more specific, I suppose that each player has a single commitment type; some
αs ∈ C for the sellers and αb ∈ C for the buyer where 0 < αb < αs. In the first stage,
first the sellers and then the buyer announces their types. Then the buyer chooses a
store to visit first. Upon the buyer’s arrival at store i, beginning of the second stage, the
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buyer and seller i bargain in discrete time according to some protocol gi that generalizes
Rubinstein’s alternating offers protocol. A bargaining protocol gi between the buyer and
seller i is defined as gi : [0,∞) → {0, 1, 2, 3} such that for any time t ≥ 0, an offer is
made by the buyer if gi(t) = 1 and by seller i if gi(t) = 2.26 Moreover, gi(t) = 3 implies a
simultaneous offer whereas gi(t) = 0 means no offer is made at time t. An infinite horizon
bargaining protocol is denoted by g = (g1, g2). The bargaining protocol g is discrete. That
is, for any seller i and for all t¯ ≥ 0, the set I i := {0 ≤ t < t¯|gi(t) ∈ {1, 2, 3}} is countable.
Notice that this definition for a bargaining protocol is very general and accommodates
non-stationary, non-alternating protocols.
In the first stage, the rational players are free to choose any offer from the set [0, 1].
An offer x ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share the seller is to receive. If the proposer’s opponent
accepts his offer, the game ends with agreement x where xe−trs denotes the payoff to
seller i, 0 is the payoff to seller j and finally (1 − x)e−trb is the payoff to the buyer. If
the proposer’s opponent rejects his offer, the game continues. Prior to the next offer, the
rational buyer decides whether to stay or leave the store. If the rational buyer decides
to stay, the next offer is made at time t′ := min{tˆ > t|tˆ ∈ I i}, for example, by the buyer
if gi(t′) = 1. The two-stage competitive-bargaining game in discrete-time is denoted by
G
〈
g, (zn, rn)n∈{b,s}
〉
(or G(g) in short). The competitive-bargaining game G(g) ends if
the offers are compatible. In the event of strict compatibility the surplus is split equally.
Throughout the game, both sellers can perfectly observe the buyer’s moves. Thus, the
players’ actual types remain to be the only source of uncertainty.
I am particularly interested in equilibrium outcome(s) of the competitive-bargaining
game G(g) in the limit where the players can make sufficiently frequent offers. Therefore,
for  > 0 small enough, let G(g) denote discrete-time competitive-bargaining game where
the buyer and the sellers bargain, in the second stage, according to the protocol g =
(g1 , g
2
 ) such that for all t ≥ 0 and i, both seller i and the buyer have the chance to make
an offer, at least once, within the interval [t, t+ ] in the bargaining protocol gi.
27 In this
sense, the discrete-time competitive-bargaining game G(g) converges to continuous time
as → 0.28
Now, let σ denote a sequential equilibrium of the discrete-time competitive-bargaining
game G(g) and σi be the rational buyer’s equilibrium strategy for store selection at
time 0. Given σi, the random outcome corresponding to σ is a random object θ(σi)
which denotes any realization of an agreed division as well as a time and store at which
26Time 0 denotes the beginning of the bargaining phase.
27More formally, either gi(tˆ) = 3 for some tˆ ∈ [t, t + ], or gi(t′) = 1 and gi(t′′) = 2 for some
t′, t′′ ∈ [t, t+ ].
28One may assume that the travel time is discrete and consistent with the timing of the bargaining
protocols so the buyer never arrives a store at some non-integer time.
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agreement is reached.
The next result shows that in the limit as  converges to 0 θ(σi)→ θ(σi) in distribu-
tion, where θ(σi) is the unique equilibrium distribution of the continuous-time game G,
that is fully characterized in the online appendix for σ1 = 1/2. Therefore, the outcome
of the discrete-time competitive-bargaining game, independent of the bargaining proto-
col g, converge in distribution to the unique (given the buyer’s initial choice of store)
equilibrium outcome of the competitive-bargaining game analyzed in Section 2.
Proposition B. As  converges to 0, θ(σi) converges in distribution to θ(σi).
I defer the proof to the online appendix.
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